企業の所有構造と会計利益の質:日本の上場企業の分析 by Mazumder  Mohammed Mehadi Masud
Corporate Ownership Structure and the Quality
of Accounting Earnings :Evidence from Japanese
Listed Firms
著者 Mazumder  Mohammed Mehadi Masud
学位授与機関 Tohoku University
学位授与番号 11301甲第15989号
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10097/57667
Corporate Ownership Structure and the Quality of Accounting 
Earnings: Evidence from Japanese Listed Firms 
[ABSTRACT] 
 
 
 
By 
Mohammed Mehadi Masud Mazumder 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
                                    
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and Management 
Tohoku University, Japan 
June, 2014 
 
 
1 
 
Corporate Ownership Structure and the Quality of Accounting Earnings: 
Evidence from Japanese Listed Firms 
 
ABSTRACT 
Whether and how quality of reported earnings differs across listed firms due to the variation 
in the ownership structure is an intriguing issue because it helps to understand the roles 
played by of different categories of shareholders over corporate reporting behaviors. Prior 
empirical studies, conducted in different countries, find that the quality of reported earnings 
of a listed firm varies with the nature of its ownership structure (e.g., Ben-Nasr et al., 2009; 
Fan & Wong, 2002; Firth et al., 2007; Givoly et al., 2010; Jung & Kwon, 2002; Katz, 2009; 
Velury & Jenkins, 2006; Wang, 2006; Warfield et al., 1995). Despite its significance, this 
literature has failed to produce any comprehensive picture about the relationship between 
ownership structure and earnings quality in Japanese context. Therefore, this study aims to 
focus on the relations between corporate ownership structure and the quality of earnings 
information in Japanese listed firms. In particular, I limit my focus to examine the roles of 
three important ownership categories in the current corporate ownership structure of 
Japanese companies. First, I examine the role of domestic institutional ownership on 
earnings quality. Japanese listed companies are largely owned by domestic institutional 
shareholders and the magnitude of ownership is highest among the firms in Asian countries. 
Nevertheless, the role of domestic institutional ownership on corporate earnings quality is 
not adequately addressed in the Japanese context. Two major groups of domestic 
institutional investors are financial institutions (i.e. city & regional banks, trust banks, 
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insurance companies and other financial institutions) and other business corporations (i.e. 
parent and associate companies, business partner companies and others).  After the 
financial crisis in the 1990s and subsequent reforms 1 , the ownership by financial 
institutions has reduced to great extent. Indeed, the average proportion of market stock held 
by financial institutional investors has declined from 45.2 percent in 1990 to 23.8 percent in 
2012 (TSE, 2012). On the other hand, the average ownership by other domestic business 
corporations has changed very little from 25.2 percent to 23.3 percent (TSE, 2012). 
Nonetheless, considering the size of current shareholdings of domestic institutional 
investors, it is reasonable to expect a significant impact of such ownership on the earnings 
quality of Japanese firms.  In prior literature, the relationship between domestic institutional 
ownership and earnings quality is explained using alternative views i.e. ‘efficient 
monitoring hypothesis’ vs. ‘private benefit of control’ and/or ‘strategic alliance 
hypothesis’. ‘Efficient monitoring hypothesis’ posits that institutional investors have the 
necessary skills, expertise, and resources to monitor and scrutinize the corporate reporting 
behavior. They have greater access to corporate inside information and do not suffer from 
free-riders problem. Moreover, due to large monetary interests tied with their investments, 
institutional investors also have incentives to have close eyes on reported earnings so that it 
does not deviate from underlying economic performance of the listed firms. Therefore, it 
can be predicted that higher level of domestic institutional ownership is associated with 
                                                            
1 In particular, Anti-Monopoly Act 1977 being effective from 1987 (Ferris & Park, 2005), BIS regulations 
and Banks’ Shareholdings Restriction Act 2001 (Miyajima & Kuroki, 2006) and the changing of accounting 
standard regarding disclosure of accrued gains or loss from share investment  being effective from fiscal year 
2000 and 2001 (Okabe, 2002). 
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better earnings quality in the listed firm. In contrast, ‘private benefit of control’ and 
‘strategic alliance hypothesis’  posit that  institutional investors might be passive, collusive 
or strategically allied which prevent them from becoming effective monitor of corporate 
reporting behaviors. Hence, it can otherwise be envisaged that higher level of domestic 
institutional ownership is associated with poorer earnings quality. Considering the current 
magnitude of domestic institutional ownership, Japanese corporate settings will be an 
appropriate arena to investigate such alternative possibilities more meticulously.  
 
Second, I examine the role of foreign institutional ownership on earnings quality. After the 
financial crisis in the 1990s, cross-border investors are increasingly occupying the greater 
percentage of ownership in Japanese listed companies. Indeed, the average proportion of 
market stock held by foreign investors increased from 4.2 percent in 1990 to 24.3 percent in 
2012 (TSE, 2012). At present, the magnitude of ownership by foreign investors in Japanese 
companies is highest among the listed firms in Asian countries. Majority of the foreign 
ownership are institutional in nature which mostly includes mutual funds and pension funds 
(Cheung et al., 1999).  The relationship between foreign institutional ownership and 
earnings quality can be anticipated using alternative views suggested in prior literature i.e. 
‘outside expertise hypothesis’ vs. ‘transient investment hypothesis’ and/or ‘information 
asymmetry hypothesis’. According to ‘outside expertise hypothesis’, foreign institutional 
investors possess superior knowledge, expertise and talent than domestic institutional 
investors to monitor the corporate reporting quality. They have the tendency to implement 
better governance and reporting transparency. Moreover, unlike domestic institutional 
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investors, they are independent monitor of firms’ reporting practices as they usually do not 
have any business ties with the investee firms.  Therefore, it can be anticipated that higher 
level of foreign institutional ownership is associated with better earnings quality in the 
listed firm. In contrast, ‘transient investment hypothesis assumes that foreign investments 
are short-term in nature and they do not have adequate incentives to become effective 
monitor of firms’ reporting aspects including earnings quality. In addition, ‘information 
asymmetry hypothesis’ assumes that foreign institutional investors lack adequate 
information to effectively monitor the corporate earnings quality due to geographical, 
cultural and institutional barriers. Therefore, it can alternatively be hypothesized that higher 
level of foreign institutional ownership is associated with poorer earnings quality. 
Incremental ownership of foreign institutions in Japanese companies allows the opportunity 
to empirically examine their association with the disclosed earnings quality. 
Third, I examine the role of insider (directors/managers) ownership on earnings quality. 
While the insider ownership in Japanese companies is very low, but such ownership is 
expected to have significant role over corporate reporting behaviors due to insider-oriented 
corporate boards and life-time employment system. The relationship between insider 
ownership and earnings quality also can be explained using two contrasting views 
suggested in prior literature i.e. ‘interest alignment hypothesis’ vs. ‘entrenchment 
hypothesis’.  According to ‘interest alignment hypothesis’, greater insider ownership aligns 
the interests of managers with that of shareholders which encourages them to report 
earnings number which is more informative about underlying performance. Hence, it can be 
anticipated that higher insider ownership is associated with better earnings quality. In 
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contrast, ‘entrenchment hypothesis’ assumes that greater insider ownership engenders more 
discretion and power in the hands of the managers to involve with more opportunistic 
earnings management. Moreover, ownership stakes also allow managers feel less pressured 
from capital markets and allow them to reduce the transparency of earnings information 
without being disciplined by outside shareholders. So, it can otherwise be expected that 
higher level of insider ownership is associated with poorer earnings quality. 
 
Inferences relating to earnings quality depend on the researchers’ ability to accurately 
measure earnings quality. Using one proxy might often lead to erroneous or mixed results 
in the prior empirical research. Moreover, finding of robust relationship between alternative 
earnings quality proxies and determinants ensure convergent validity.2  Therefore, in this 
study, three individual measures of earnings quality are considered which include absolute 
abnormal accruals, accruals estimation error, and earnings predictability measure. To add 
robustness, I also use composite earnings quality measure using two approaches (common 
factor score and average percentile rank) as indicator of overall earnings quality. I further 
apply the instrumental variables approach to ensure the robustness of causal inference of 
ownership structure variables to earnings quality.  
 
As additional analysis, I also try to investigate how the additional governance mechanisms 
i.e. board characteristics and external audit quality are associated with earnings quality of 
                                                            
2 According to Dechow et al. (2010), convergent validity means the confirmation that different proxies 
quantify the same underlying construct of earnings quality. It ensures the robustness of the results to 
alternative earnings quality measures. 
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Japanese firms.3 Apart from or in addition to ownership structure, prior studies also posit 
that board characteristics and external audit quality could be significant determinants of 
earnings quality (Beasley, 1996; Beekes et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2006; Ferreira et al., 2011; 
Firth et al., 2007, Vafeas, 2000; Warfield et al., 1995). Board characteristics are considered 
crucial factors which reflect the quality of internal control of listed firms, and presume to 
have significant impact on the quality of reported earnings. Vafeas (2000) argues that 
corporate boards are responsible for monitoring the quality of the information contained in 
financial reports. He mentions, “in fear of scrutiny by their firm's effective board, 
opportunistic managers may voluntarily report more accurate earnings information, thereby 
fending off unwelcome monitoring by the board” (p. 143). In Japanese corporate boards, 
majority of the members are corporate insiders. Therefore, Japanese context is interesting to 
investigate how the insider-dominated board and its’ characteristics   associated with the 
earnings quality of Japanese listed firms. Furthermore, in the empirical research, it is 
generally presumed that Big4 audit firms provide better quality audit than non Big4 audit 
firms. As a result, the firms which are being audited by Big4 audit firms have the tendency 
to report better quality earnings (e.g., Becker et al.,1998; Firth et al., 2007; Francis & Wang, 
2008; Kim et al., 2003; Wang, 2006). Japanese audit market is highly concentrated. The 
Big4 audit firms capture approximately seventy percent of audit markets. Therefore, it is 
also interesting to investigate the role of Big4 and non-Big4 audit quality on earnings 
quality of listed Japanese firms. 
                                                            
3 Cohen et al. (2004) identify ownership structure as external governance mechanism, and board of directors 
and external audit as internal governance mechanisms which affect financial reporting quality. 
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This study use sample of Japanese listed firms selected from the period 2001 to 2013 
(estimation period from 2007 to 2012). The selection process yields 7,248 firm-year 
observations as estimation sample size from 1,208 non-financial firms publicly traded in 
first and second sections of TSE and OSE. The results show that higher domestic 
institutional (financial) ownership is associated with better earnings quality i.e. lower 
absolute abnormal accruals, lower accruals estimation error and greater earnings 
predictability. The findings support the argument that institutional shareholders especially 
financial institutions ensure effective monitoring over corporate reporting practices which 
lead to better earnings quality.  In sharp contrast, I find that incremental foreign 
institutional ownership in Japanese listed firms is associated with poorer earnings quality 
i.e. higher absolute abnormal accruals, higher accruals estimation error and lower earnings 
predictability. The findings are contrary to the oversimplifying assumption that increasing 
cross-border shareholdings always lead to better reporting quality.  I also find that though 
the ownership by domestic business corporations (non-financial) is almost as large as 
ownership by domestic financial institutions, but it has no significant relationship with any 
of the proxies of earnings quality.  In addition, I find that higher insider 
(directors/managers) ownership is associated with lower earnings quality (i.e. absolute 
abnormal accruals) but such relationship is not consistently significant at alternative proxies 
of earnings quality (i.e. accruals estimation error and earnings predictability measure). My 
results are consistent when I use composite earnings quality metrics (common factor scores 
and average percentile ranks) which combine the individual earnings quality proxies into an 
all-inclusive quality measure. I also apply the instrumental variables approach to ensure the 
8 
 
robustness of causal inference of ownership structure variables to earnings quality. My 
results are also consistent in alternative estimation approach i.e. quintile (median) 
regression estimation.  In order to provide further insights, using cross-sectional data for the 
year 2012, I examine how the additional corporate governance mechanisms i.e. board 
characteristics and external audit quality are associated with earnings quality of Japanese 
firms. None of these attributes except larger board size and presence of directors from the 
main bank are found to be significantly associated with better earnings quality of Japanese 
companies.  These empirical results are robust to control for firm size, leverage, 
profitability, growth and incidence of reporting negative earnings or loss.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways which also make it unique from 
other prior studies.  
First, Japanese companies have unique ownership and governance structure which is 
unlikely within their counterparts in the US and the UK.  In fact, Japan’s institutional 
environment and its firms’ ownership structures are quite different from other East Asian 
economies (Fan & Wong, 2002).4  This analysis of Japanese corporations allows us to 
study the subject of earnings quality in a different ownership context. Firth et al. (2007) 
mention that ownership patterns differ across firms and nations, so the results of one 
jurisdiction should not be generalized to other.  Moreover, given that the Japanese equity 
market (i.e. TSE) is the third largest in the world, providing evidence from Japan on the 
issue is interesting and timely on its own merits. 
                                                            
4 In Japanese firms, the dominant ultimate owners are institutions, which are not similar in other East Asian 
economies (Fan & Wong, 2002).  
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Second, unlike most existing research, which usually studies just one aspect of ownership 
structure, I carefully select three important ownership categories in Japanese firms i.e. 
domestic institutional, foreign institutional, and insider ownerships. By incorporating both 
inside and institutional ownership into the analysis, I provide more comprehensive evidence 
on the linkage between ownership structure and the quality of earnings information. 
Third, unlike most existing studies on earnings quality, which usually use single earnings 
quality proxy, I apply three important earnings quality matrices which are well accepted 
and found to have non-trivial market effects in the empirical research. Using single proxy 
might often lead to erroneous and mixed findings in prior studies. I also compute a 
composite earnings quality measure using two contemporaneous approaches (common 
factor scores and average percentile ranks), which combine the three individual earnings 
quality measures into one representative quality indicator.  
Fourth, as robustness check, I also try to deal with the possible issue of causal inference 
between ownership structure and earnings quality using instrumental variables approach.  
Fifth, I also examine the influences of board characteristics and external audit quality on 
the quality of reported earnings which has not been explored yet in Japanese context. 
Last but not least, the research dealing with issue of ownership structure and earnings 
quality is very sparse in Japan.  Moreover, prior literature provides little guidance on the 
exact nature of the relationship between ownership structure and earnings quality. 
Therefore, this study extends the very limited research on this issue and adds to a growing 
body of research on ownership structure and earnings quality. 
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There are several expected implications of this study for regulators, investors, and future 
researchers. For Japanese regulators and policy makers, the lessons from this study would 
definitely assist them to reshape their future policies toward the governance structure of 
Japanese firms, particularly ownership structure. Fan and Wong (2002) argue that it is 
important for policy makers and regulators to understand how the ownership structure is 
associated with incentives for firms to reduce or increase accounting information quality.  
They also argue that blindly adopting international accounting standards and disclosure 
rules will not improve the corporate transparency as investors have reservation about the 
quality of accounting numbers. For investors and creditors, the findings would help them to 
assess the credibility of reporting numbers based on the ownership structure of the listed 
firms. Wang (2006) mentions that the understanding about how earnings quality varies with 
ownership structure provides potential benefits to investors. Overall, my findings of the 
effect of ownership structure are important to any stakeholders who depend on the financial 
performance of listed Japanese firms. This paper also has important implications for 
researchers on financial reporting. I provide robust and comprehensive evidence about the 
association between ownership structure and the quality of reported earnings of Japanese 
firms. The findings will assist the future researchers to thinks more broadly both 
theoretically and technically while investigating the ownership structure and corporate 
reporting behaviors in Japanese context.   
 
There are atleast two potential limitations in my study. First, it is possible that the proxies 
of earnings quality are measured with error and/or do not reflect other aspects of earnings 
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quality, especially market based earnings quality as suggested by Francis et al. (2004). 
These limitations could affect our conclusions about the empirical results. Second, while I 
have attempted to control for other factors that affect the earnings quality of a firm, there 
could be omitted correlated variables that affect the association between ownership 
structure and earnings quality. In my future research, I am expecting to address these 
limitations and provide more insights into the role of different types of ownership on 
earnings quality of Japanese listed firms. 
 
